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The Religiously Devout Judge
Stephen L. Carter*
I. A Liberal Axiom
My subject is the religiously devout judge. I am especially gratified
to be addressing this subject here at Notre Dame, where a few years ago,
Governor Cuomo of New York gave a very important talk on the
problems faced by religiously devout public officials in a nation strongly
committed to religious pluralism. 1 His views on that occasion were quite
powerfully put, although, as will become clear, he and I do not end up in
the same place.
Governor Cuomo, I think, would say that it is wrong for any govern-
ment official to take conscious account of her own religious understand-
ing as she formulates policy. Indeed, I take that notion to be virtually an
axiom of the liberal political consensus, and certainly of contemporary
legal theory. It is just that axiom, however, that I propose to challenge.
I should like to begin by asking you to consider a hypothetical nomi-
nee for a federal judgeship. The nominee is known to be deeply reli-
gious. Among the teachings of her religion is a firm command to cherish
and protect the sanctity of every human life, a proposition which causes
her to reject abortion, the death penalty, and all forms of armed conflict
except self-defense.
Her confirmation hearings, one might well imagine, would be pan-
demonium. Part of the reason would be her substantive policy views.
Pro-choice forces would attack her. So would law-and-order advocates.
And cold warriors. In that sense, her confirmation hearings would be
like any others in these degenerate days in which would-be judges are
asked in advance to tell the Senate and the public how they plan to vote.2
But there is one sense in which her confirmation hearings would
very likely be different. She would probably be asked a question that
went something like this: "If we confirm you and you become a judge,
will you be able to separate your religious beliefs from the task ofjudg-
ing?" For the sake of convenience, I will call this the separation question.
Now, she might respond to the separation question by saying, "Senator,
I'm sorry, but my religion teaches me to use the levers of power to aid
the oppressed, and if confirmed as a federal judge, I would have to follow
that teaching." If she really wanted to be ajudge, however, she would of
course have to answer the question with a "Yes"-or better still, with a
"Yes, Senator, my religious views are entirely a private matter, and they
would not influence my public judicial views in any way."
* Professor of Law, Yale University. Professor Carter delivered a lecture based on this paper at
"The Moral Lawyer" symposium at Notre Dame Law School on February 24, 1989.
I See Cuomo, Religious Beliefand Public JHoralit)': A Catholic Govemor's Perspective, I NOTRE DAMEJ.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984).
2 See Carter, The Confinnation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1189-95 (1988).
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And that answer, if the Senators believed her, would take care of the
separation question.
But should it? I am not so sure. Kent Greenawalt, in his very fine
book on the role of religious convictions in the formation of public pol-
icy, asserts that there is in the United States a widely shared "assumption
that one can be a seriously religious person and a liberal participant in
liberal society."3 He may be right about what most Americans think, but
I fear that the coerced affirmative answer to the separation question po-
tentially points in another direction. Greenawalt suggests that "occa-
sional reliance by judges on religious convictions is not improper."4 I
would go further, and suggest that reliance by judges on their personal
religious convictions is as proper as reliance on their personal moral con-
victions of any other kind.
For reasons that I will explain, the separation question, along with
its required answer, carries an implicit trivialization ofreligious faith, and
a denigration of religion as against other ways of knowing. For better or
worse, we live in a nation in which judges are frequently expected to rely
on moral knowledge in reaching their decisions, in constitutional law and
elsewhere. The separation question is anti-religious in character unless
religious knowledge can be shown to be different in some relevant way
from other moral knowledge, a proposition usually assumed, but not ar-
gued for, in liberal theory.
The separation question loses its anti-religious character, I will sug-
gest, only if one accepts a model of judging in which judges strive to
reason and act without regard to t~eir own moral convictions. Adopting
that model would of course mean the abandonment of the "fundamental
rights" ,prong of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. If the
courts are to continue to enunciate fundamental rights, however, then I
really d<? think that we face a stark choice: we can permitjudges to use all
of their moral knowledge, including religious conviction, or we can deni-
grate religion.
II. Two Kinds ofJudges
I want first to discuss two types ofjudges, whom I will call the objec-
tive judge and the morally sensitive judge. I hasten to add that I am not
pretending to invent anything new, and that the names are simply conve-
nient labels for what you will quickly recognize as ideal types, that is,
aspirational models. The models, then, are not ofwhat judges are, but of
competing visions of what judges should strive to be. As will be seen, a
different approach to the problem of the religiously devout citizen who
wants to be a judge follows from each model.
A. The ObjectiveJudge
The liberal ideal is an objective judge, but when one uses so contro-
versi?l a word, it is important to define it with care. Objectivity, as I will
3 K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVlcrIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 216 (1988).
4 [d. at 239. Greenawalt devotes only three pages of his book to the problem of religious con-
viction in adjudication.
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use the term, is a goal, not a description, and an objective judge is a
judge who considers the goal both attainable and desirable.
The objective judge considers adjudication an exercise of interpreta-
tion, that is, the application to a text of a set of interpretive rules. The
objective judge believes that the legal community of which she is a part
shares a consensus on the interpretive rules that judges are to apply.5
Her vision of her role is to discover the rules and to try to apply them to
the cases that come before her.
These interpretive rules are supposed to yield relatively determinate
results, which is another way of saying that the result of the interpreta-
tion should not depend in any significant way on the biases of the inter-
preter. The judge is thus not making the law, but discovering it.
Obviously, to the extent that the public perception so vital in the confir-
mation process really holds judges to this standard, the hypothetical
nominee who wants to be confirmed has little choice but to answer the
separation question with a promise to keep her religious convictions to
herself.
But take careful note of why the would-be objective judge makes this
particular promise. In order to fit the objective model, she must in effect
promise that she will strive to put aside all of her prejudices and precon-
ceptions. Her religious preconceptions are simply one part of this per-
sonal moral knowledge that she must promise to ignore. If her personal
religious convictions should somehow leak into her reasoning process,
she will have failed, not because her convictions are religious, but be-
cause they are her personal convictions.
The objective-judge model, in short, does not treat moral knowl-
edge with a religious base any differently from moral convictions formed
by any other process. All of it is bias and preconception, and all of it is
what the judge is supposed to ignore.
But while I must confess that I am one of those who is sometimes
wistful for the quite fictitious objective model ofjudging, not many peo-
ple believe any longer that judges are capable of putting to one side all of
their preconceptions when they sit down to deliberate. Certainly not
many legal scholars believe it.6 It may even be that most people think the
objective judge model is a bad idea. How else to explain the titanic bat-
tles that are sometimes waged over confirmation ofjudicial nominees be-
lieved by some to have the wrong set of moral values? Ifjudges are, or
are expected to be, morally sensitive, then the fact that religious
prejudices distort the search for objectivity is not a reason to avoid them.
In that case, it is necessary to look elsewhere for the reason.
5 In this definition, I essentially follow Owen Fiss. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 739 (1982); see also Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985).
6 Even Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the preeminent defender of something close to the objective
judge model, is at pains to note that he makes no pretense that it is possible to put all preconcep-
tions aside. See Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About
Objectivity Any More, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983).
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B. The Morally SensitiveJudge
The competing model ofjudging presents the ideal of a morally re-
flective judge, who engages quite self-consciously in a form of reasoning
best described as moral philosophy. Indeed, there are cases in which, if
there is to be a decision at all, a degree of reliance on moral conviction
can scarcely be avoided, and might even be desirable.
The natural tendency of the legal scholar on hearing this claim
might be to prepare for a diatribe about decisions in the so-called "fun-
damental rights" strand of constitutional cases, but I will postpone that
diatribe for a moment, in order to point out that other fields of law, too,
feature cases in which judges are called upon to give morally reasoned
responses. Greenawalt offers the example of a judge who must decide
under an immigration statute whether an applicant is of "good moral
character."7 Another example is the power of common-law judges' to
avoid enforcement of private agreements on the ground that they shock
the conscience of the court.
But let me tum to my more particular concern, namely, the Supreme
Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence, which seems to have legiti-
mized a process through which constitutional judges enforce a sort of
natural law in the name of enforcing the Constitution. It is a bit late in
the day to argue that when judges decide cases involving such issues as
reproductive freedom or reapportionment, they are searching for rights
that are already there, just waiting to be discovered. On the contrary,
whether the judge claims to be enforcing the community's moral norms
or updating the moral vision of the Founders, it is quite evident that the
judge cannot make such decisions without relying, at least in part, on her
own moral knowledge. Indeed, it is surely the expectation that judges
will rely on their own moral knowledge in such cases that leads to the
grilling of judicial nominees about their feelings toward controversial
precedents, and, sometimes, even toward controversial public policies.
In short, for better or for worse, there appears to be a widely shared
expectation that judges will sometimes rely on personal moral knowl-
edge. The question, then, is whether one can make sense of a rule
prohibiting judges from relying on their moral knowledge if it happens
to have an explicitly religious basis. This can only be done, as I men-
tioned at the outset, if we are able to demonstrate that religious knowl-
edge is different from other moral knowledge in some way that is
relevant to the task ofjudging. Even if religious knowledge does tum out
to be different, if we nevertheless permit religiously devout citizens to
take the bench, provided only that they offer an affirmative answer to the
separation question, than we must also be assuming that the citizen is
capable of sorting out the religious moral knowledge from moral knowl-
edge of other kinds. It is to the investigation of these matters that I now
tum.
7 K. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 240.
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III. The Religiously Devout Judge
A. The Establishment Clause Conundrum
I would like now to return to the hypothetical with which I opened
this paper and to imagine that the nominee has given the first answer that
I mentioned: "Senator, I'm sorry, but my religion teaches me to use the
levers of power to aid the oppressed, and if confirmed as a federaljudge,
I would have to follow that teaching." Liberal theory, as ordinarily un-
derstood, ought to find this an easy case. If the nominee cannot separate
her religious biases from the rest of her moral knowledge, then she
ought to withdraw her name from consideration. The formal constitu-
tional argument that undergirds this proposition rests on the establish-
m<:;nt clause. According to the Supreme Court, that clause commands
"that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor op-
posing religion."8
In recent years, this neutrality principle has been read not simply to
prohibit the imposition of religious ritual or belief, but to prohibit the
government from acting out of religious conviction. The rule, evidently,
is that citizens may hold religious convictions but may not act on them,
and, in particular, may not use them as the basis for policy preferences.
This is a very odd result in a nation premised on the freedom of religious
belief, but it is difficult to find another line of reasoning that explains, for
example, the court decisions striking down the teaching of scientific crea-
tionism in the public schools.9 It is one thing to say that creationism is
bad science, but the fact that it is bad science makes it only silly, not
unconstitutional. Despite pages and pages ofanalysis, the only thing that
any of the courts have really been able to add to the proposition that
creationism is bad science is the fact-if it is a fact-that many of those
who endorse creationism and many of the legislators who voted to have it
taught in schools acted out of religious conviction. lO
The reading of the establishment clause that permits, indeed en-
courages, inquiry into legislative motivation has recently come under
challenge. I I And well it should, because it was never anything but a
rather t.ortured and unsatisfactory reading of the clause. As one critic has
put the matter, there is good reason to think that "what the religion
clauses of the first amendment were designed to do was not to remove
religion and religious values from the arena of public debate, but to keep
them there."12 The establishment clause by its terms forbids the imposi-
tion of religious belief by the state, not statements of religious belief in
8 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
9 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). For another example of a recent decision that
is most readily explained on motivational grounds, see Wallace v.Jalfree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (strik-
ing down "moment-of-silence" in public school classrooms).
10 See Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE LJ. 977.
II The criticism of motivation as a test underlies much of the Greenawalt book discussed earlier.
See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 3. Another important critique is Justice Scalia's dissent in Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 Van Wyk, Liberalism, Religion and Politics, PUB. AFF. Q, July 1987, at 59, 68 (paraphrasing
Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2]. LAw & RELIG. 326, 328 (1984».
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the course of public dialogue. I3 By equating acting out of religious moti-
vation with imposing religious belief, the modem approach to the estab-
lishment clause seems, as John Ely has said in quite a different context,
"to mistake a definition for a syllogism." 14 The distinction is one with
more than semantic significance.
-. Consider, for example, the call by Reinhold Niebuhr and others back
in the 1920's for the "Christianization" of American industry.I5 The
word "Christianization" did not mean the imposition of ritual and doc-
trine; it meant, rather, the transformation of industry into a new form
that would accord with a principle of respect for the human spirit that
Niebuhr and the rest found lacking in industrial organization of the day.
Critics called it socialism, or perhaps communism. But whatever it was,
religious faith was plainly at its heart.
Niebuhr struck a chord, not only· with any number of left-leaning
Protestants, but also with a good number of socialists who had no reli-
gious position. Suppose the response had been greater; suppose that
legislatures had begun enacting programs that matched the socialist
spirit of "Christianization." The programs would be purely secular in
their operation, and could certainly be justified in secular terms. But
under an establishment clause that is read to equate acting out of reli-
gious motivation with imposing religious belief, I suppose that the pro-
grams would be unconstitutional, because both those who proposed
them and many of those who voted for them would have done so out of
religious conviction.
That is-or should be-a deeply troubling result. A rule holding
that the religious convictions of the proponents are enough to render a
statute unconstitutional represents a sweeping and tragic rejection of the
deepest beliefs of tens of millions of Americans, who are being told, in
effect, that their views do not matter. If I might beg your indulgence
while I quote myself briefly, I put the matter tqis way in an earlier paper:
In a nation that prides itself on cherishing religious freedom, it is
something of a puzzle that a Communist or a Republican may try to
have his worldview reflected in the nation's law, but a religionist can-
not; that one whose basic tool for understanding the world is empiri-
cism may seek to have her discoveries taught in the schools, but one
whose basic tool is Scripture cannot; that one whose conscience moves
him to doubt the validity of the social science curriculum may move to
have it changed, but one whose religious conviction moves her to
doubt the validity of the natural science curriculum may not. 16
All of this is accomplished, as I said before, in the name of a principle of
neutrality. But if neutrality actually requires such a result, then it mu~t
have very little to do with the free exercise of religion, and a great deal to
do with keeping religion in its place. The danger is that the establish-
13 See McConnell, Why 'Separation' Is Not the Key to Church-State Relations, 106 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
43 (1989).
14 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 924 (1973).
15 See R. Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 62-80 (1985).
16 Carter, supra note 10, at 985-86.
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ment clause might be on the verge of becoming not anti-establishment,
but simply anti-religion.
I recognize that that is a fairly harsh criticism, and I would like to
take a moment to explain it. One of the difficulties in contemporary first
amendment jurisprudence, as others have pointed out, is that the estab-
lishment clause seems to be on the verge of swallowing the free exercise
clause; it is as though the neutrality commanded by the establishment
clause constitutes a hostility toward the freedom protected by the free
exercise clause. I7 If the religious conviction of proponents is seriously to
become a ground for invalidating legislation, then tens of millions of
Americans will be prohibited from demanding government action in ac-
cord with their consciences, not because the dictates of their consciences
are wrong on the merits, but because their consciences have been formed
in the wrong way. They have not had their eyes on the proper concep-
tion of the public good. And while a few smart theorists have tried to
demonstrate that any government action based on preferences unrelated
to the public good ought to be suspect,I8 the simple fact is that the only
other times that the constitutional courts insist on knowing how con-
sciences were formed are when the government stands accused of racial
or sexual bias or of intentionally censoring speech.
That, then, is the camp in which this emerging view of the establish-
ment clause places those whose religious convictions shape their policy
views-among the bad guys, who evidently number racists, sexists, cen-
sors, and people who believe in God. The camp, you will note, is basi-
cally a Carotene Products camp. In Carolene Products, remember, the
Supreme Court warned of the need for special judicial vigilance on be-
half of "discrete and insular minorities" who might be excluded from the
political processes because of prejudice. 19 By placing the religiously de-
vout in this camp, the Court is saying that when religious conviction
forms the basis for policy, it is very likely to be oppressive-the way that
racial discrimination, for example, is oppressive-and is therefore sus-
pect. That would be a nasty and anti-religious presumption even in the
absence of the enormous contributions of religious leaders to virtually
every important social movement in the nation's history; against that fur-
ther background, the presumption is simply ludicrous. But it is there.
B. The Celebration of Reason
Now what, you may ask, has this to do with judging? The answer is
that the separation question-the one, you recall, to which the nominee
must respond in the affirmative-entails a set of assumptions about reli-
gious conviction that also underlie the modern approach to the establish-
ment clause. The modern approach implicitly (sometimes explicitly)
accepts the liberal proposition that religion is a distorting force in the
public dialogue on which liberal theory depends. The liberal dialogue,
so the theorists explain, is one in which reason ought to rule, and who-
17 See McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146 (1986).
18 See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the COl/Stitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
19 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 nA (1938).
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ever makes the best argument ought to win. But religious convictions
are not permitted to play a role. The dialogue must be conducted in
accord with a requirement of rationality.20
It 'is, of course, very old news to point out that the rationality re-
quirement effectively privileges a materialistic, analytical form of reason-
ing over other ways of knowing. But it is particularly ironic that the
rationality requirement is used to bar religious conviction from the de-
bate, because freedom of religion is at least mentioned in the Constitu-
tion-rational dialogue is not. More to the point, as opinion ,surveys
keep reminding us, religious faith is more widespread in the United
States than in any other nation in the Western world. The effect of
privileging rationality, however, is to skew the public dialogue that liber-
alism demands, so that everyone has a voice except those people whose
epistemology rests on faith. If religiously 'devout citizens wish to enter
the dialogue, they must eschew the way of knowing that guides every
other aspect of their lives. They must instead adopt the epistemology of
contemporary, scientistic liberalism, 'Yith its sharp distinction between
facts and values and its commitment to ends-means rationality as a sup-
posed mediating dialogic force.
A mediating force is thought necessary because of our commitment
to religious pluralism. There is, after all, no single religion that might be
called the American religion, and if not for the requirement of a rational
dialogue (so the argument runs) individuals of different views would be
unable to talk to one another, because they would share no common
moral language. That, at least, is the theory. But it is not quite as self-
evidently true as those of us raised on modern establishment clause juris-
prudence are acc.ustomed to thinking.
The idea that rationality is needed as a mediating force among irrec-
oncilable religious beliefs-a proposition which modern liberal theorists
state, but one for which they rarely argue-may have its roots in the En-
lightenment understanding that religious disagreements more than once
plunged the world into war. There is, however, no a priori reason to as-
sume that individuals of different religions in the United States of the late
twentieth century are equally unwilling to discuss their religious differ-
ences and resolve their policy differences short of armed conflict. And if
the religiously devout are willing to try, then it is less clear that a mediat-
ing force is needed.21 Indeed, the insistence ofcontemporary liberal phi-
losophers, generally in the absence of argument" that religious faith
shapes people's minds in ways so radically different that they cannot pos-
sibly engage in the dialogue unless they purge their biases is itself a kind
of anti-religious prejudice.22 Remarkably, and tragically, current law,
and current legal scholarship, continue to suggest that such a prejudice is
what the establishment clause commands.
20 The dialogic model is a feature of Rawls, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); and
becomes explicit in Ackennan, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
21 The work of jeffrey Stout has largely influenced this argument. See]. STOUT, THE FLIGHT
FROM AUTHORITY 239-43 (1981).
22 Cf MICHAEL]' PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAw 72-73 (1988) (suggesting the implausibility
of "bracketing" one's most-deeply felt convictions).
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C. The Religious jV1ind
The implicit message, then, that the constitutional argument sends
to people who are religious is that in the public dialogue that is the lib-
eral ideal, their views do not really matter. But even putting the insult to
faith aside, the liberal insistence that judges and other government offi-
cials place religious conviction entirely to one side plainly misconceives
the nature of faith. Religious faith is not something that can be shrugged
offlike an unattractive article of clothing. The very idea of devotion sug-
gests a way of ordering all life and all knowledge, including, although not
exclusively, moral knowledge. As Paul Tillich has put the point:
Faith as ultimate concern is an act of the total personality. It hap-
pens in the center of the personal life and includes all its elements.
Faith is the most centered act of the human mind. It is not a move-
ment of a special section or a special function of man's total being.
They all are united in the act of faith. But faith is not the sum total of
their impacts. It transcends every special impact as well as the totality
of them and it has itself a decisive impact on each of them.23
Once faith is recognized, in Tillich's terms, as "ultimate concern," the
repeated liberal insistence that it be abandoned when the devout citizen
enters into the public realm is not merely puzzling, but actually perverse.
It is perverse because it asks the devout citizen to become another per-
son, to abandon the most important aspect of her life. No one would
imagine asking her to leave behind an arm or a leg in order to join her
fellow citizens in their deliberations over policy; no one would ask her
even to abandon moral or political conviction. But if her source of her
conviction is faith, and if the faith is of religious dimension, then she
must transform herself into another person-one who is not religiously
devout.
Why does liberalism insist on excluding the religiously devout from
its dialogue? Obviously, at one level, liberalism is genuinely concerned
with the tyranny that might result from the government's religious moti-
vation. The fear is that allowing religious conviction into the dialogue,
we stand at the brink of a long and slippery slope. Near the bottom lies
the so-called "Christian Amendment" to the Constitution, proposed fre-
quently in the past, which would recognize, as fundamental American
law, "the authority and law ofJesus Christ."24 At the bottom of the slope
lies something like the Islamic Republic of Iran-or perhaps that anar-
chic no-man's-land that the maps still insist is a nation called Lebanon.
These images are undeniably frightening ones. But slippery slopes,
as Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out, are often constructed by those
who plan to give someone else a push when she isn't looking.25 And
besides, slippery slopes are a problem only if you can't think of a way to
23 P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 4 (1957).
24 See M. SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II 99-100 (1988)
The idea of declaring ours aChristian nation seems to have gained new life. See Shupe, The Recoll-
stme/ionist Movement on the New Christian Right, 106 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 880 (1989).
25 See Feminist Discourse, lV/oral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. II, 24
(1985) (panel discussion) (remarks of Catharine MacKinnon).
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stay off of them.26 One can permit religious conviction to playa role in
some government decisions without therefore having to sustain all gov-
ernment decisions in which it plays a role. The Christian Amendment
would be a horribly oppressive abuse of government power, but so
would scores of other ideas that have nothing to do with religion. Those
ideas are opposed because they are oppressive-and that's a perfectly
adequate reason to oppose a Christian Amendment, too.
So let's step off the slippery slope, and suggest what seems to be a
more sensible possibility, and one particularly relevant to the problem of
the religiously devout judge who won't give the right answer to the sepa-
ration question. Perhaps the liberal mistrust-let's call it what it is-the
liberal mistrust for religious faith rests not, as is usually asserted, on a
fear of what might be imposed, but instead on a fear about the process
through which the religiously devout public official decides what to im-
pose. This fear, I would suggest, has two closely related components:
(1) concern about whether the religiously devout citizen is resting her
judgment on some privileged insight, inaccessible to her fellow citizens,
and (2) concern about whether the mind of the religiously devout citizen
is open in the liberal sense, that is, amenable to reason. For reasons that
I will explain, neither of these concerns distinguishes religious devotion
from devotion to other moral principles. On the contrary, each concern
applies equally well to the decision process ofany individual guided by a
personal moral compass.
(1) Privileged Knowledge-The liberal image of the religiously devout
citizen seems to be one of an individual whose moral knowledge pro-
ceeds from a privileged insight that others do not or cannot share. The
religiously devout citizen evidently has taken a peek at some holy text or
listened to some holy interpreter, and has made up her mind accord-
ingly, once and for all.
Now, in the first place, that is very much.a caricature of how religion
operates, particularly in the United States, with its strong tradition of
religious dissent-a tradition that per~eates even those denominations
that supposedly are most authoritarian.27 Moreover, the reason for the
liberal distrust of privileged insights cannot really be the concern that
others might refuse to accept the text as authoritative, for that pluralistic
concern is (or ought to be) identical if the text is Mill or Locke or Lenin
or Charles Murray. Nor can the reason be that others might find the text
inaccessible, because that is certainly true if the text is Mill or Locke or
Lenin or Murray. .
Besides, the liberal dialogue itself proceeds from a privileged in-
sight-the insight that the state must be neutral among competing con-
ceptions of the good. That is a nice idea, but the ideal of neutrality, as
26 Staying off the slope is formally a m;1tter of finding limiting "rules ~ufficiently determinate that
a later interpreter will not stumble downward in the name of following precedent. See Schauer,
Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
27 See Rabkin, Disestablished religion in America, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 124.
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even its proponents recognize, cannot be justified in its own terms.28 It
must, in effect, be assumed. In that sense, it rests on untestable faith-
or, put otherwise, on a privileged insight.
(2) The Open Mind-The other part of the liberal fear is the idea that
people who are religious tend to be closed-minded. I take this to mean
that people who base their moral convictions on religious belief do not
readily abandon those beliefs in the face of liberal dialogue. I am quite
sure that this is very often true, but it is equally true, I would think, of
people of any strongly held convictions.
The fact that convictions will not be readily abandoned hardly seems
a sensible reason for not permitting them to playa role in the dialogue.
Kent Greenawalt, among others, has proposed that religious citizens who
wish to take part in public discussion simply omit their privileged insights
and argue on the merits-although he also prefers that secular liberals
avoid the "privileged" insights of rationalism, and argue on the merits as
well.29 In this connection, I think there is much in Martin Marty's
analysis:
[R]eligionists who do not invoke the privileged insights of their revela-
tion or magisterium can enhance and qualify rationality with commu-
nity experience, intuition, attention to symbol, ritual and narrative. Of
course, these communities and their spokespersons argue with one an-
other. But so do philosophical rationalists. Argument, after all, con-
tributes to the search for virtues and for ways to express them.3o
But while what Marty and Greenawalt propose is sensible, there is
another point as well. Even if the religiously devout citizen does say, in
dialogue, "I believe this because God says it," there is a substantial set of
dialogic responses that are different from "No, God doesn't"-although,
I hasten to add, that's an answer, too. One quite obvious response is,
"Do you really imagine that your God would mandate something so fun-
damentally unjust?" And if, as seems to me quite likely, the religiously
devout citizen responds angrily, "What's so unjust about it?", a dialogue
is already joined. But even if the citizen responds, "God's word is the
only measure of Justice," that answer is not noticeably more diffident
than an entire range of refusals by citizens of strong convictions to enter
into dialogue with those who disagree with them.
The point is that whatever might be said about the religiously de-
vout, there is no reason-or at least, once again, no a priori reason-to
assume that they are more closed-minded than others of strong moral
beliefs. Many citizens enter into public debate on the basis of assump-
tions that they are unwilling to have challenged. Sometimes they win,
sometimes they lose, but only if they base their assumptions on a reli-
gious understanding is their point of view entirely excluded from public
dialogue. And that is a distinction that it is time to eradicate.
28 Cf Ackerman, What Is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372, 387 (1983) ("it would be a
category mistake to imagine that there could be a Neutral justification for the practice of Neutral
justification").
29 See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 3.
30 Marty, When /vI)' Virtue Doesn't Match Your Virtue, 105 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1094,1096 (1988).
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IV. Religious Conviction and Fundamental Rights
What, then, should this hypothetical judge do if confirmed? What
does it mean to say that she can rely on her religious convictions? How is
she to reason? How is she to write?
These questions, unhappily, are all too large for a short paper like
this one. The easy way out, I suppose, is to say that she is to do exactly
what other judges do, and when other judges would ordinarily rely on
their moral knowledge, she is free to rely on hers, too. As Kent Greena-
walt has pointed out, this reliance would not necessarily extend to the
writing of opinions31-at least not if one believes, along with quite a
number ofstudents of the judicial process, that an opinion is not an expla-
nation of how a decision was reached, but rather a formalized justification
for it, reining in the judge by forcing her to articulate her decision in a
professionally responsible way.
So if religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the
deliberative process, but not the process ofjustification. This distinction
is actually quite important, because the requirement of justification in
accordance with a set ofprofessional norms is generally said to be a disci-
plining force onjudges who might otherwise let their personal values run
rampant. They might make decisions on the basis of moral conviction,
but they must justify them in terms of the received norms ofjudging.
The religiously devout judge should be able to operate in the same
way. If the case before the court involves determining whether the four-
teenth amendment protects a particular fundamental right, other judges
will proceed eventually to consider their personal values, even knowing
as they must that they cannot put their personal values into the written
opinion. The religiously devout judge would similarly proceed to her
values, with the same caveat.
Now, of course, we ought to be uncomfortable with the idea that the
religiously devout judge will proceed at once to her religious values-but
only for the same reasons that we ought to be uncomfortable with the
idea that any judge will proceed at once to 'her own values. Even the
model of the morally sensitive judge does not propose an entire aban-
donment of the norms of judging. I do not suggest here what those
norms are, but I do suggest that they ought to restrain judges whose
moral knowledge has a religious basis and judges whose moral knowl-
edge does not in exactly the same way. The idea, in short, is to treat all
moral knowledge as one and once we decide to allow judges to rely on it,
not to be, fussy about its source.
I expect this proposal to make liberals uncomfortable, because the
liberal uneasiness with religion is not readily overcome by brief, scholarly
analysis. And yet, even if I have not convinced you that the religiously
devout judge ought to be free to rest her moral knowledge on her reli-
gious faith, I hope that I have at least offered a plausible case for the
proposition that there is no apparent reason to treat her religious faith
differently from moral faiths of other kinds. The implication of this in-
31 K. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 239.
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sight for the "do-the-right-thing" type of judicial review should be
plain-either all judges should be free to rely on their moral knowledge
as they make decisions, or no judges should.
The ideal of the objective judge was slain by the legal realists long
before the critical legal studies movement resurrected it in order to kill it
again. But the ghost of the objective judge refuses to go away. I doubt
that the objective judge will die quietly, as long as liberals continue to
think that letting ajudge rest her decisions on a moral understanding is a
good idea. Because once a judge's moral understanding is permitted to
play a role, the liberal argument cannot distinguish religiously based
knowledge from other moral knowledge, or at least, cannot do so without
arguments that require a bit too much cognitive dissonance. The aspira-
tional model of the objective judge might offer the only path to sanity.
And if we continue to pursue distinctions as crazy as this one, a path to
sanity will be a useful thing to have.
